Popkin´s Defi nition of Modern Skepticism
Richard Popkin off ers a very clear and precise defi nition of modern skepticism: "a philosophical view that raises doubt about the adequacy or reliability of the evidence that could be off ered to justify any proposition."
1 Skepticism is understood as that position according to which there is no conclusive reason that proves that a certain belief is true. Skeptics share this conception of justifi cation with their antagonists, dogmatists. "Th e antithesis of scepticism . . . is 'dogmatism', the view that evidence can be off ered to establish that at least one nonempirical proposition cannot possibly be false."
2 Th erefore, the main diff erence between skepticism and dogmatism lies in how each sect evaluates or assesses arguments, reasons, and evidence, and not in holding or not holding beliefs. According to Popkin, suspension of judgement is limited to "the question of whether these beliefs were true," that is, the skeptic suspends his judgement because a certain belief may not be true, so refrains from affi rming that it is true, because it may be false.
Th at is why Popkin goes on to say that " 'sceptic' and 'believer' are not opposing classifi cations . . . Th e skeptic may, like anyone else, still accept various beliefs." 3 Believers can be dogmatic, when they think they have a good, rational justifi cation for their beliefs, or when they hold a belief based on arguments or evidences; or they can be skeptical, when they hold beliefs despite their lack of rational justifi cation for these beliefs, or when they hold beliefs not based on any argument or by faith. Th erefore, the expression 'skeptical fi deism' is perfectly all right. Modern skepticism has nothing to do "with disbelief, especially disbelief of the central doctrines of the Judeo-Christian tradition". If one holds, as did the fi deists, that 'God exists' without claiming that one has conclusive reasons or that one knows it, one may be a skeptic.
From Popkin's defi nitions, one could draw a picture of the conceptual connexions among concepts like truth, judgement, belief, reasoning, and justifi cation in modern skepticism. I am not sure Popkin would accept these conceptual connections as I will explain them here. We may, perhaps, deepen our understanding of modern skepticism by assessing this picture.
According to this picture, it is fundamental to make a distinction between p and 'p is true'. All the dispute between dogmatists and skeptics would turn on 'p is true', but not on p. Th e skeptic can hold a belief p, and he does not suspend his judgment concerning p, but he will not assert 'p is true'. So understood, a judgement is something of this kind: 'p is true', and suspension of judgement is not to affi rm, nor to deny, that 'p is true'. In order to assert 'p is true', one needs a justifi cation. Th is is what dogmatists think they can provide. Dogmatists off er a J (reasons, arguments, evidence) for sustaining that 'p is true' and cannot possibly be false. Skeptics argue that J (reasons, arguments, evidence) is not completely reliable; in the light of skeptical arguments, p may be false; therefore, skeptics do not assent to 'p is true', since this last proposition has not been established by philosophical arguments. Skeptics, however, may go on accepting p, but this does not mean 'p is true'.
5 Beliefs themselves are untouched by the skeptical challenge, as if they were protected or invulnerable to skeptical arguments. Th e skeptical challenge is directed only at the justifi cation that would lead us from merely affi rming p to the more robust, dogmatic position of holding 'p is true'.
With this picture of modern skepticism in mind, I would like to examine some French philosophers that deal with skepticism: La Mothe le Vayer, Foucher, Huet, and Bayle. I will be asking: 1) whether skepticism is concerned merely with justifi cation of beliefs, and not with beliefs themselves; 2) whether it is an attack against reason; 3) whether
